Word-object co-occurrence statistics are a powerful information source for vocabulary learning, but there is considerable debate about how learners actually use them. While some theories hold that learners accumulate graded, statistical evidence about multiple referents for each word, others suggest that they track only a single candidate referent. In two large-scale experiments, we show that neither account is sufficient: Cross-situational learning involves elements of both. Further, the empirical data are captured by a computational model that formalizes how memory and attention interact with co-occurrence tracking. Together, the data and model unify opposing positions in a complex debate and underscore the value of understanding the interaction between computational and algorithmic levels of explanation.
Natural languages are richly structured. From sounds to phonemes to words to referents in the world, statistical regularities characterize the units and their connections at every level. Adults, children, and even infants have been shown to be sensitive to these statistics, leading to a view of language acquisition as a parallel, possibly implicit, process of statistical extraction (Gómez & Gerken, 2000; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) . Recent experiments across a number of domains, however, show that human statistical learning may be significantly more limited than previously believed (Johnson & Tyler, 2010; Trueswell, Medina, Hafri, & Gleitman, 2013; Yurovsky, Yu, & Smith, 2012) .
We focus here on the use of statistical regularities to learn the meanings of concrete nouns (known as cross-situational word learning; Pinker, 1989; Siskind, 1996; Yu & Smith, 2007) . Because words' meanings are reflected in the statistics of their use across contexts, learners could discover the meaning of the word ''ball'' (for instance) by noticing that while it is heard across many ambiguous contexts, it often accompanies play with small, round toys. A growing body of experiments shows that adults, children, and infants are sensitive to such co-occurrence information, and can use it to map words to their referents (Smith & Yu, 2008; Suanda, Mugwanya, & Namy, 2014; Vlach & Johnson, 2013; Yu & Smith, 2007) .
Information about a word's meaning can thus be extracted from the environmental statistics of its use (Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Siskind, 1996) . But this analysis is posed at what Marr (1982) called the ''computational theory'' level: dealing only with the nature of the information available to the learner. At the ''algorithmic'' level-the level of psychological instantiation in the mind of the learner-this idealized statistical computation could be realized in many ways, and the computation human learners actually perform is a topic of significant debate (see e.g., Yu & Smith, 2012) . Do human learners really track and maintain a representation of word-object co-occurrences? Some evidence suggests that humans are indeed gradual, parallel accumulators of statistical regularities about the entire system of word-object co-occurrences, simultaneously acquiring information about multiple candidate referents for the same word (McMurray, Horst, & Samuelson, 2012; Vouloumanos, 2008; Yurovsky, Fricker, Yu, & Smith, 2014) . Other evidence suggests that statistical learning is a focused, discrete process in which learners maintain a single hypothesis about the referent of any given word. This referent is either verified by future consistent co-occurrences or instead rejected, ''resetting'' the learning process (Medina, Snedeker, Trueswell, & Gleitman, 2011; Trueswell et al., 2013) . While both of these algorithmic-level solutions will, in the limit, produce successful word-referent mapping, they will do so at very different rates. In particular, if learners track a only a single referent for each word, it may be necessary to posit additional biases and constraints on learners in order for human-scale lexicons to be learned in human-scale time from the input available to children (Blythe, Smith, & Smith, 2010; Reisenauer, Smith, & Blythe, 2013) .
To distinguish between these two accounts, previous experiments exposed learners to words and objects in which co-occurrence frequencies indicated several high-probability referents for the same word. At the group level, participants in these experiments showed gradual learning of multiple referents for the same word (e.g., Vouloumanos, 2008; Yurovsky, Yu, & Smith, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.07.013 0010-0277/Ó 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
